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ABSTRACT 
US voters shared large volumes of polarizing political news and information in the form of links to content from Russian, 
WikiLeaks and junk news sources. Was this low quality political information distributed evenly around the country, or 
concentrated in swing states and particular parts of the country? In this data memo we apply a tested dictionary of 
sources about political news and information being shared over Twitter over a ten day period around the 2016 
Presidential Election. Using self-reported location information, we place a third of users by state and create a simple 
index for the distribution of polarizing content around the country. We find that (1) nationally, Twitter users got more 
misinformation, polarizing and conspiratorial content than professionally produced news. (2) Users in some states, 
however, shared more polarizing political news and information than users in other states. (3) Average levels of 
misinformation were higher in swing states than in uncontested states, even when weighted for the relative size of the 
user population in each state. We conclude with some observations about the impact of strategically disseminated 
polarizing information on public life. 
 
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA AND THE 
2016 US ELECTION 
Social media plays an important role in the circulation of 
ideas about public policy and politics. Political actors and 
governments worldwide are deploying both people and 
algorithms to shape public life.1,2 Bots are pieces of 
software intended to perform simple, repetitive, and 
robotic tasks. They can perform legitimate tasks on social 
media like delivering news and information—real news 
as well as junk—or undertake malicious activities like 
spamming, harassment and hate speech. Whatever their 
uses, bots on social media platforms are able to rapidly 
deploy messages, replicate themselves, and pass as 
human users. They are also a pernicious means of 
spreading junk news over social networks of family and 
friends.  
Computational propaganda flourished during the 
2016 US Presidential Election. There were numerous 
examples of misinformation distributed online with the 
intention of misleading voters or simply earning a profit. 
Multiple media reports have investigated how “fake 
news” may have propelled Donald J. Trump to victory.3–5 
What kinds of political news and information were social 
media users in the United States sharing in advance of 
voting day? How much of it was extremist, 
sensationalist, conspiratorial, masked commentary, fake, 
or some other form of junk news? Was this misleading 
information concentrated in the battleground states where 
the margins of victory for candidates had big 
consequences for electoral outcomes? 
 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND JUNK NEWS 
Junk news, widely distributed over social media 
platforms, can in many cases be considered to be a form 
of computational propaganda. Social media platforms 
have served significant volumes of fake, sensational, and 
other forms of junk news at sensitive moments in public 
life, though most platforms reveal little about how much 
of this content there is or what its impact on users may 
be. The World Economic Forum recently identified the 
rapid spread of misinformation online as among the top 
10 perils to society.6 Prior research has found that social 
media favors sensationalist content, regardless of whether 
the content has been fact checked or is from a reliable 
source.7 When junk news is backed by automation, either 
through dissemination algorithms that the platform 
operators cannot fully explain or through political bots 
that promote content in a preprogrammed way, political 
actors have a powerful set of tools for computational 
propaganda.8 Both state and non-state political actors 
deliberately manipulate and amplify non-factual 
information online.  
 Fake news websites deliberately publish 
misleading, deceptive or incorrect information purporting 
to be real news for political, economic or cultural gain.9 
These sites often rely on social media to attract web 
traffic and drive engagement. Both fake news websites 
and political bots are crucial tools in digital propaganda 
attacks—they aim to influence conversations, demobilize 
opposition and generate false support.  
 
SAMPLING AND METHOD 
Our analysis is based on a dataset of 22,117,221 tweets 
collected between November 1-11, 2016, that contained 
hashtags related to politics and the election in the US. 
Our previous analyses have been based on samples of 
political conversation, over Twitter that used hashtags 
that were relevant to the US election as a whole.  
In this analysis, we selected users who provided 
some evidence of physical location across the United 
States in their profiles. Within our initial sample, 
approximately 7,083,691 tweets, 32 percent of the total 
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traffic, were coming from users who volunteered enough 
location information in their profile to determine which 
state they were in. Many users have not provided enough 
details to allow us to identify which state they were 
tweeting from, added a location with a spelling mistake, 
or just entered a made-up location or a joke. After 
cleaning the data, we were able to successfully label 49.1 
percent of the tweets from the users who provided any 
form of location information within their profile. The rest 
of the tweets were coming from profiles with a location 
field that refers to a location outside of the US or 
contains a location that we were not able to identify. Full 
access to user location data would provide better 
resolution on the distribution of users across states, but 
this response rate is sufficient to help us begin to 
understand the relationship between where users are and 
what kinds of political content they are being served by 
Twitter. 
These tweets and associated data were collected 
from Twitter’s public Streaming API at the time of the 
election, not retroactively with the Search API. The 
platform’s precise sampling method is not known, but the 
company itself reports that the data available through the 
Streaming API is at most one percent of the overall 
global public communication on Twitter at any given 
time.10 Tweets were selected based on a list of hashtags 
associated with the US election, and tweets were 
collected from the API that (1) contained at least one of 
the relevant hashtags; (2) contained the hashtag in the 
text of a link, such as a news article, shared in that tweet; 
(3) were a retweet of a message that contained the 
hashtag in the original message; or (4) quoted tweets in 
which the hashtag was included but in which the original 
text was not included and Twitter used a URL to refer to 
the original tweet. 
 To evaluate different sources being shared over 
social media, we determined the source of each of the 
URLs in the dataset. Overall, 1,275,430 of the 7,083,691 
tweets from users that had provided location information 
also contained a URL. Many sources that were easy to 
identify were auto-coded, but other kinds of content 
obscured by link shorteners or re-shared less were also 
catalogued. Effectively this typology is built on 
successful cataloguing of 81% of the 1,275,430 links, 
with the remainder being single URLs shared only a few 
times or otherwise inaccessible. This typology that has 
emerged over our study of elections in five democracies: 
 
• Professional News Outlets. 
o Major News Brands. This is political news and information 
by major outlets that display the qualities of professional 
journalism, with fact-checking and credible standards of 
production. They provide clear information about real authors, 
editors, publishers and owners, and the content is clearly produced 
by an organization with a reputation for professional journalism. 
This content comes from significant, branded news organizations, 
including any locally affiliated broadcasters. 
o Minor News Brands. As above, but this content comes from 
small news organizations or startups that display evidence of 
organization, resources, and professionalized output that 
distinguishes between fact-checked news and commentary. 
Professional publishers that cover other domains of social life, such 
as sports, fashion, or technology, but occasionally produce high 
quality political news. 
 
• Professional Political Content  
o Government. These links are to the websites of branches of 
government or public agencies. 
o Experts. This content takes the form of white papers, policy 
papers, or scholarship from researchers based at universities, think 
tanks or other research organizations. 
o Political Party or Candidate. These links are to official 
content produced by a political party or candidate campaign. 
 
• Polarizing and Conspiracy Content 
o Junk News. This content includes various forms of 
propaganda and ideologically extreme, hyper-partisan, or 
conspiratorial political news and information. Much of this content 
is deliberately produced false reporting. It seeks to persuade readers 
about the moral virtues or failings of organizations, causes or 
people and presents commentary as a news product. This content is 
produced by organizations that do not employ professional 
journalists, and the content uses attention grabbing techniques, lots 
of pictures, moving images, excessive capitalization, ad hominem 
attacks, emotionally charged words and pictures, unsafe 
generalizations and other logical fallacies. 
o WikiLeaks. These tweets provide links to unverified claims  
or irrelevant documentation on WikiLeaks.org. 
o Russia. This content was produced by known Russian 
sources of political news and information. 
 
• Other Political News and Information 
o Citizen, Civic, or Civil Society. Links to content produced 
by independent citizens, civic groups, or civil society 
organizations. Blogs and websites dedicated to citizen journalism, 
citizen-generated petitions, personal activism, and other forms of 
civic expression that display originality and creation more than 
curation or aggregation. 
o Humor and Entertainment. Content that involves political 
jokes, sketch comedy, political art or lifestyle- or entertainment-
focused coverage. 
o Religion. Links to political news and information with 
distinctly religious themes and faith-based editorializing presented 
as political news or information. 
o Other Political Content. Myriad other kinds of political 
content, including portals like AOL and Yahoo! that do not 
themselves have editorial policies or news content, survey 
providers, and political documentary movies. 
 
• Other 
o Social Media Platforms. Links that simply refer to other 
social media platforms, such as Facebook or Instagram. If the 
content at the ultimate destination could be attributed to another 
source, it is. 
o Not Available. Links that are no longer available or not 
successfully archive after repeated attempts. 
o Other Non-Political. Links to sites that actually have no 
political content. 
 
Our two-stage coding process involved 
developing an initial, grounded coding scheme and 
running it as a kind of pilot study of a subsample of 
Michigan-based users (See Memo 2017.1).11 We then 
revised our definitions and recoded the complete dataset 
according to the categories defined below. 
 This methodology has several limitations. 
Tweets about the US Presidential Election by individuals 
who did not use one of these hashtags would not have 
been captured. Tweets from people who used these 
hashtags but were tweeting about something else would 
be captured in this sample. We infer that volunteered 
location information is a proxy for the political 
constituency of a human user.  While demographic 
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factors may explain a user’s decision to geotag tweets, 
researchers outside Twitter know less about the 
distribution of self-reported location information.12 There 
are some complex techniques for inferring physical 
location from tweet content or metadata, but there is 
evidence that volunteered information from urban areas 
is more trustworthy and it is not clear that the machine 
learning techniques yield better data than self-reported 
data.13,14 The coding of source types was derived from 
the dataset and is not intended to be a comprehensive list 
of all types of information providers. Some types of 
political news and information are easy to catalogue. The 
category of “other content” was used for links to 
completely unpolitical pages. The overall percentages of 
different information sources are intended as a metric for 
the overall information environment surrounding the 
2016 Presidential Election and as a way to stimulate 
further research and conversation.  
 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
This sample allows us to draw some conclusions about 
the character and process of political conversation over 
Twitter during the election, particularly as it relates to US 
voters and the circulation of different kinds of news and 
political information in swing states. 
 In Data Memos 2016.1-2016.4 we analyze 
political conversation over Twitter during US 
Presidential candidate debates and the 10 days leading up 
to the election itself.15–18 Data Memo 2017.1 evaluates 
the circulation of junk news by taking a close look at 
what kinds of content Twitter users in Michigan were 
sharing just before the election.11 In that study, we found 
that (1) in Michigan, conversation about politics over 
Twitter mirrored the national trends in that Trump-related 
hashtags were used more than twice as often as Clinton-
related hashtags. (2) Social media users in Michigan 
shared a lot of political content, but the amount of 
professionally researched political news and information 
was consistently smaller than the amount of extremist, 
sensationalist, conspiratorial, masked commentary, fake 
news and other forms of junk news. (3) Not only did such 
junk news “outperform” real news, but the proportion of 
professional news content being shared hit its lowest 
point the day before the election. If junk news was so 
prevalent in this important swing state, how was it 
distributed across the rest of the country?  
 What Were Citizens Sharing? To investigate 
the distribution of political news and information being 
shared over social media we took the catalogue of 
content found in Michigan and classified the links being 
shared in the entire national sample. Table 1 catalogues 
the different kinds of URLs being shared in election-
related tweets by users in the US. We removed tweets 
with links that were in foreign languages, no longer 
available, or inaccessible for some other reason. All in 
all, 1,033,742 links were still available online and 
successfully labelled. 
Table 1 presents the findings of this grounded 
catalogue of content. Overall, 20% of the links being 
shared with election-related hashtags came from 
professional news organizations. Links to content 
produced by government agencies, political parties and 
candidates, or experts, altogether added up to just 10% of 
the total. Indeed, only small fractions of the content being 
shared originated with the political parties, candidates, 
civil society groups, universities or public agencies.  
Two things should be noted across categories. 
First, the number of links to professionally produced 
content is less than the number of links to polarizing and 
conspiratorial junk news. In other words, the number of 
links to Russian news stories, unverified or irrelevant 
links to WikiLeaks pages, or junk news was greater than 
the number of links to professional researched and 
published news. Indeed, the proportion of misinformation 
was twice that of the content from experts and the 
candidates themselves. Second, a worryingly large 
proportion of all the successfully catalogued content 
provides links to polarizing content from Russian, 
WikiLeaks, and junk news sources. This content uses 
divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, and presents faulty 
reasoning or misleading information to manipulate the 
reader’s understanding of public issues and feed 
conspiracy theories. Thus, when links to Russian content 
and unverified WikiLeaks stories are added to the volume 
of junk news, fully 32% of all the successfully 
catalogued political content was polarizing, conspiracy 
driven, and of an untrustworthy provenance.  
Table 1: What Political News and Information Were US Twitter 
Users Sharing during the Election? 
Type of Source N % of 
Subset 
% of 
Total 
    
Professional News Content    
Major News Brands 196,697 77  
Minor News Brands 60,055 23  
Subtotal 256,752 100 20 
    
Professional Political Content    
Political Party or Candidate 121,323 93  
Experts 6,350 5  
Government 2,294 2  
Subtotal 129,967 100 10 
    
Polarizing and Conspiracy Content    
Junk News 203,591 79  
WikiLeaks 48,068 19  
Russia 7,683 3  
Subtotal 259,342 100 20 
    
Other Political News and Information    
Other Political 97,900 59  
Citizen, Civic or Civil Society 34,935 21  
Political Humor or Entertainment 30,021 18  
Religion 2,124 1  
Political Merchandise 2,067 1  
Subtotal 167,047 100 13 
    
Other    
Social Media Platform 195,470 42  
Not Available 241,688 52  
Other Non-Political 25,164 5  
Subtotal  462,322 100 36 
    
TOTAL 1,269,736  100 
    
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 1-11/11/16. For the 
full list of hashtags used to capture this sample see Memo 2017.1).11 
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 Polarizing Content and Swing States. To help 
understand the national distribution of polarizing content 
from Russian, WikiLeaks, and junk news sources, we 
then create a simple index, organized by states. Since 
states have different numbers of Twitter users, for each 
state we calculated the ratio of a state’s tweets about 
politics to the entire country’s tweets about politics. Then 
we added up all the tweets with junk news, links to 
unverified WikiLeaks pages, or links to Russian content 
(such as RussiaToday or Sputnik). For each state, we 
calculated a second ratio—the ratio of each state’s junk 
content to the entire country’s junk content. Putting these 
two ratios together gives an index of the proportion of 
junk news tweets from the state relative to the number of 
all political tweets from the state. The distribution of this 
“ratio of ratios” is uneven because half the distribution of 
possible values ranges from 0 to 1 (less junk news than 
expected given national averages) and the other half 
ranges from 1 to +infinity (more junk news than expected 
given national averages). However, by taking the natural 
log of the ratio of ratios the index will become more 
balanced: from –infinity to 0 becomes less junk news 
than expected, and 0 to +infinity becomes more junk 
news than expected.  Mathematically, the 0 point on the 
index is the national average. 
  
∑
∑
=
country
state
states all
state
  
inksPoliticalL
inksPoliticalL
LinksPolarizing
LinksPolarizing
RatiosofRatio T
 
 
Expression A: Indexing Polarizing Political Content from Russian, 
WikiLeaks, and Junk News Sources 
 
Table 2 identifies the weighted junk news scores for each 
state. States with scores around zero are close the 
national average, so they have about the concentration of 
junk news expected given the amount of Twitter 
conversation about politics occurring in that state. States 
with more negative scores have less junk news than 
expected given the amount of Twitter conversation about 
politics occurring in that state. Finally, states with more 
positive scores have unusual concentrations of junk 
news, even considering how much political conversation 
was occurring among Twitter users in that state. States 
that were considered swing states on November 2, 2017, 
according to the non-partisan National Constitution 
Center are marked by an (*) asterisk.19 
 At the bottom of this table the simple but 
revealing averages are calculated. This index is weighted 
for the relative number of tweets about politics generated 
by each state. If a state had about the level of junk news 
to be expected for the size of its Twitter user base, the 
state earned a score around the national average. If it had 
more junk then expected it scored above that, and if it 
had less than expected it scored below that. Table 2 
reveals that polarizing content was surprisingly 
concentrated in swing states even considering the amount 
of political conversation occurring in the state. Indeed, 12 
of the 16 swing states were above the average among less 
competitive states, and 11 of the 16 were above the 
national average. States that were not hotly contested 
had, on average, lower levels of junk news. 
 
Table 2: Concentration of Polarizing Political Content from 
Russian, WikiLeaks, and Junk News Sources, Indexed by State 
State Junk News Index 
North Dakota -0.75 
Washington D.C. -0.54 
Iowa* -0.38 
New York -0.30 
Wyoming -0.26 
New Mexico -0.20 
Nebraska -0.19 
Rhode Island -0.18 
Hawaii -0.17 
Wisconsin* -0.16 
Minnesota* -0.15 
Washington -0.14 
Illinois -0.13 
Kansas -0.13 
Connecticut -0.12 
Utah -0.11 
Idaho -0.09 
Mississippi -0.07 
Alaska -0.07 
Massachusetts -0.06 
California -0.03 
Maine* -0.03 
Oregon -0.02 
Louisiana -0.01 
Colorado* +0.01 
Ohio* +0.01 
New Jersey +0.01 
Maryland +0.03 
Michigan* +0.05 
Arkansas +0.05 
Texas +0.06 
Georgia* +0.07 
South Carolina +0.10 
Vermont +0.10 
New Hampshire* +0.11 
Pennsylvania* +0.12 
Oklahoma +0.14 
North Carolina* +0.14 
Virginia* +0.14 
Florida* +0.16 
Nevada* +0.18 
Indiana +0.18 
Tennessee +0.20 
Missouri* +0.22 
Alabama +0.23 
Arizona* +0.25 
Kentucky +0.26 
South Dakota +0.27 
Delaware +0.35 
Montana +0.45 
West Virginia +0.47 
  
  
Averages  
Not Contested State Average -0.02 
National Average +0.00 
Swing State Average +0.05 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 1-11/11/16. 
Note: (*) Indicates a swing state in November 2016 according to 
the National Constitution Center. 
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Figure 1:  States With Above Average Concentrations of Polarizing Political Content from Russian, WikiLeaks, and Junk News Sources 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 1-11/11/16. 
Note: Shades of green indicate that state users shared less of this content than expected given the size of their Twitter user base. Shades of red 
indicate that state users shared more junk content than expected given the size of their Twitter user base. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Many of the swing states getting highly concentrated 
doses of polarizing content were also among those with 
large numbers of votes in the Electoral College. Figure 1 
presents a heat map of the distribution of junk news 
around the country. 
 The term “fake news” is difficult to 
operationalize, so our grounded typology reflects the 
diversity of organizations behind the content that was 
circulated over Twitter by people in the United States in 
the ten days before voting day. Social media users in 
many states traded links to high quality political news 
and information. Junk news, characterized by ideological 
extremism, misinformation and the intention to persuade 
readers to respect or hate a candidate or policy based on 
emotional appeals, was just as, if not more, prevalent 
than the amount of information produced by professional 
news organizations. 
 
ABOUT THE PROJECT 
The Project on Computational Propaganda 
(www.politicalbots.org) involves international, and 
interdisciplinary, researchers in the investigation of the 
impact of automated scripts—computational 
propaganda—on public life. Data Memos are designed to 
present quick snapshots of analysis on current events in a 
short format. They reflect methodological experience and 
considered analysis, but have not been peer-reviewed. 
Working Papers present deeper analysis and extended 
arguments that have been collegially reviewed and that 
engage with public issues. The Project’s articles, book 
chapters and books are significant manuscripts that have 
been through peer review and formally published.  
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